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After Naturalism: Wild Systems Theory
and the Turn To Holism
A Reply to Saskia K. Nagel
J. Scott Jordan & Brian Day
We agree with Dr. Nagel’s assertion that explanations within cognitive science
can be thickened by an infusion of pragmatism and anthropology. We further pro-
pose that  because of  its  direct  challenge of  the correspondence thinking that
tends to underlie contemporary indirect- and direct realism, Wild Systems Theory
provides a coherence framework that conceptualizes reality as inherently context
dependent and, therefore, inherently  meaning-full.  As a result, pragmatists can
appeal to the reality of lived experience, anthropologists can appeal to the mean-
ingful, multi-scale influences that shape an individual, and both can do so without
having to justify the reality status of meaning in relation to the meaning-less view
of reality we have been led to via the indirect- and direct-realism inherent in con-
temporary naturalism. 
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“We are caught up in an inescapable network of mutuality…”
Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., 1964
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1 Introduction
In  her  commentary  on  our  paper,  Dr.  Saskia
Nagel calls for a thickening of the descriptions
we give in cognitive science. By  thickening she
means, …a dense description specifying details
and patterns and considering contextual factors,
of human experience and cognition. (Nagel this
collection, p. 3). Dr. Nagel further asserts that
one way to achieve such a thickening is to infuse
cognitive science with the views of pragmatism
(i.e.,  John  Dewey)  and  anthropology  (i.e.,
Timothy Ingold). We couldn’t agree more, and
we applaud Dr. Nagel’s  appeal to Dewey and
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Ingold as a means of allowing multi-scale con-
textual factors to play a much larger role in our
accounts of cognition and consciousness. 
Given  our  agreement  on  the  important
contributions  that  pragmatism  and  anthropo-
logy can make to cognitive science, we also feel
the need to express our belief that WST (Wild
Systems  Theory)  and  its  conceptualization  of
organisms  as  self-sustaining  embodiments  of
context (versus  physical-mental,  or  mind-body
systems)  actually  creates  a  conceptual  frame-
work within which the views of Dewey and In-
gold  can  move  beyond  the  conceptual  con-
straints  of  contemporary  pragmatism and  an-
thropology. 
2 Pragmatism and Wild Systems Theory
In  a  recent  paper  regarding  WST,  Jordan &
Vinson (2012) propose that Dewey’s  brand of
pragmatism represented  a  rather  unique  com-
bination of an idealist approach to metaphysics
and an epistemic (i.e., pragmatic) approach to
science.  Specifically,  Dewey’s  early training as
an idealist philosopher led him to reject the ob-
jective-subjective,  correspondence-driven  ap-
proach to reality and truth that was prominent
in the indirect- and direct-realist versions of nat-
uralism that were emerging during his time. In-
stead, Dewey believed, as did his idealist, coher-
entist mentors,  that  meaning  and  value  were
constitutive of reality. In addition, given his co-
herence- (versus  correspondence-) driven meta-
physics,  Dewey  believed  that  science  was  a
practice that afforded us the opportunity to re-
veal patterns of contingency within the contexts
in which we are embedded. He repeatedly em-
phasized this epistemic, pragmatic approach to
science as a way to challenge the more ontolo-
gically  minded,  metaphysical  approach  to  sci-
ence that was being espoused by indirect- and
direct-realist forms of naturalism:
The search for ‘efficient causes’ instead of
for final causes, for extrinsic relations in-
stead  of  intrinsic  forms,  constitutes  the
aim of  science.  But  the  search  does  not
signify a quest for reality in contrast with
experience of the unreal and phenomenal.
It  signifies  a  search  for  those  relations
upon which the occurrence of real qualities
and values depends, by means of which we
can regulate their occurrence. To call ex-
istences as they are directly and qualitat-
ively experienced ‘phenomena’ is not to as-
sign to them a metaphysical status. It is to
indicate that they set the problem of as-
certaining the relations of interaction upon
which  their  occurrence  depends.  (Dewey
1929, pp. 103-104)
Despite Dewey’s concerns, his unique combina-
tion of idealist ontology and scientific pragmat-
ism  eventually  gave  way  to  what  Gardner
(2007) refers to as the  Hard Naturalism of our
time, in which meaning and value are seen as
completely  unnecessary  in  a  scientific,  causal
description of reality:
By the time we get to Freud … let alone
Quine, naturalism is conceived as resting
exclusively  on  theoretical  reason  and  as
immune to non-theoretical attack—it is as-
sumed  that  nothing  could  be  shown  re-
garding the axiological implications of nat-
uralism that would give us reason to re-
consider  our commitment to it:  we have
ceased to think that naturalism is essential
for the realization of our interest in value,
and do not believe that it would be an op-
tion for us to reject naturalism even if it
were to prove thoroughly inimical to our
value-interests. (p. 24)
Within the contemporary context of Hard Nat-
uralism, pragmatic philosophers such as Richard
Shusterman (2008) tend to downplay and even
eschew  ontology.  Specifically,  Shusterman  as-
serts that 20th century ontological approaches to
the mind and body that were espoused by the
likes of William James and Merleau-Ponty actu-
ally led us to devalue bodily sensations in the
name of developing our rational capacities. 
Merleau-Ponty’s  commitment  to  a  fixed,
universal phenomenological ontology based
on  primordial  perception  thus  provides
further reason for dismissing the value of
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explicit somatic consciousness. Being more
concerned with individual differences and
contingencies,  with  future-looking  change
and  reconstruction,  with  pluralities  of
practice that can be used by individuals
and groups for improving on primary ex-
perience, pragmatism is more receptive to
reflective  somatic  consciousness  and  its
disciplinary uses for philosophy. (Shuster-
man 2008, p. 66)
Clearly,  there  are  important  continuities
between  the  pragmatic  philosophies  of  Dewey
and  Shusterman  (Jordan 2010).  Specifically,
Shusterman’s  focus  on  practice overlaps  with
Dewey’s conceptualization of science as a prac-
tice as opposed to a tool for metaphysics. In ad-
dition, Shusterman’s  emphasis  on  primary ex-
perience is consistent with Dewey’s idealist com-
mitment to the reality of experience. The major
difference between the two seems to be Shuster-
man’s  lack of  interest  in,  or  perhaps outright
disdain for metaphysics. 
One  possible  reason  for  Shusterman’s
(2008) lack of interest in metaphysics may be
our contemporary commitment to Hard Natur-
alism. As was stated in the quotation by Gard-
ner (2007), Hard Naturalism seems so implicitly
accepted these days, it seems difficult, if even
possible,  to  propose  a  metaphysics  in  which
value, meaning, and experience are constitutive
of  reality.  Because  of  its  commitment  to  the
reality of experience however, as well as its clear
questioning of  the  indirect-  and direct-realism
that lie at the core of Hard Naturalism, WST
seems  perfectly  situated  to  take-up  Dewey’s
anti-correspondence arguments and place them
within a 21st century coherentist framework. In-
stead of remaining within the centuries-old con-
ceptual framework of mind and body however, as
Dewey did, WST takes the philosophical risk of
creating  a  new concept:  specifically,  embodied
context.  We say  philosophical risk because the
notion  of  embodied  context  conceptualizes
meaning in the exact opposite fashion as Hard
Naturalism. Specifically, it renders meaning ubi-
quitous throughout reality. Given the century of
philosophical  work  that  has  ultimately  led  to
the Hard Naturalist belief that reality is inher-
ently meaningless, we suspect some might see it
as simply silly or heretical to assert that reality
is inherently meaningful, through and through.
This is why we consider the concept of  embod-
ied context risky. Regardless of the risks how-
ever, we see WST as a means of getting mean-
ing back into reality. It does so by following the
lead  of  the  idealists,  particularly  Oakeshott
(1933), who did not appeal to the a priori, the
transcendental, or the absolute, and refused to
describe reality in  terms of  the observer-inde-
pendent  intrinsic  properties  that  ultimately
make it difficult, if not logically impossible, for
meaning  to  be  constitutive  of  reality.  Within
WST’s  coherentist  perspective,  Dewey’s  prag-
matism is restored as a 21st century framework,
and pragmatism, in general, can commit itself
to the reality of lived experience in an ontolo-
gical fashion that does not require justification
in relation to Hard Naturalism.
To be sure, there have been those scholars
who have attempted to introduce meaning back
into  Hard  Naturalism  by  referring  to  it  via
terms such as emergent and irreducible. Gardner
(2007) however, refers to such attempts as Soft
Naturalism and states the following:
If, then, it is demonstrated successfully by
the  soft  naturalist  that  such-and-such  a
phenomenon is not reducible to the nat-
ural facts austerely conceived, this conclu-
sion is not an end of enquiry, but rather a
reaffirmation  of  an  explanandum,  i.e.,  a
restatement that  the phenomenon stands
in need of metaphysical explanation. Irre-
ducibility  arguments,  if  successful,  yield
data  that  do  not  interpret  or  explain
themselves, but call for interpretation: the
soft naturalist needs to say something on
the subject of why there should be, in gen-
eral,  phenomena  that  have  substantial
reality, but do not owe it to the hard nat-
ural facts. (p. 30)
WST avoids collapsing into Soft Naturalism be-
cause it directly challenges the Hard Naturalist
assumption  of  intrinsic,  context-independent
properties. It does so by asserting that all prop-
erties  are  necessarily  context-dependent  and
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thus, inherently meaning-full. In short, meaning
is constitutive of reality.
3 Anthropology and Wild Systems 
Theory
In addition to providing a contemporary frame-
work  for  pragmatism,  WST  also  provides  a
straightforward means  of  integrating  cognitive
science and anthropology. For example, in her
comment on our paper Dr. Nagel points to the
work of Timothy Ingold as a contemporary ex-
ample  of  an  anthropologist  whose  work  can
thicken our understanding of cognition and ex-
perience.
Knowing does not lie in the establishment
of  a  correspondence  between  the  world
and its  representation,  but  is  rather  im-
manent in the life and consciousness of the
knower  as  it  unfolds  within  the  field  of
practice set up through his or her presence
as a being-in-the-world. (2011, p. 159)
While WST couldn’t agree more with  Ingold’s
(2011) critique of correspondence approaches to
the nature of knowledge, WST’s conceptualiza-
tion  of  living  systems  as  multi-scale,  self-sus-
taining  embodiments  of  the  phylogenetic,  cul-
tural,  social,  and  ontogenetic  contexts  within
which they emerged and within which they sus-
tain themselves provides a straight forward ex-
planation of why knowing is, “…immanent in the
life and consciousness of the knower…” (Ingold
2011, p. 159). Specifically, knowing is immanent
in being-in-the-world because organisms, as em-
bodiments  of  context,  are knowledge  (Jordan
2000). In short, they are world in world. Thus,
as implied by Ingold, to be is to mean. 
A potential advantage of WST’s approach
to  this  issue  is  that  it  directly  addresses  the
Hard Naturalism that underlies the correspond-
ence-driven  thinking  Ingold (2011)  critiques.
That is, by problematizing the realist assump-
tion of context-independent, intrinsic properties,
WST asserts it is logically impossible for mean-
ingless things to exist. That is, it is logically im-
possible  to  be and  not mean. By engaging in
this ontological spadework, WST does not suffer
the risk of collapsing into Soft Naturalism, as
does Ingold’s position, or any position for that
matter, that attempts to establish the reality of
experience  without  addressing  Hard  Natural-
ism’s assertion that meaning is not constitutive
of reality. 
In addition to addressing  Ingold’s (2011)
being-in-the-world approach to  meaning,  WST
also addresses Dr. Nagel’s assertion that anthro-
pology can thicken cognitive science by leading
us to consider the continuous, un-ending influ-
ence that multiple scales of context (e.g., phylo-
genetic, cultural, social, and ontogenetic) have
on the nature of bodies and meaning. She devel-
ops this  point by referring to  Susan Oyama’s
(1985) assertion that in addition to inheriting
genes, infants also inherent a heterogeneous col-
lection of multi-scale contexts, including other
persons,  that  continuously  shape,  and  are
shaped  by,  the  developing  individual.  Oyama
refers to this collection of contexts as a develop-
mental system. While describing Oyama’s work,
Dr. Nagel states: 
This  multi-scale,  interaction-driven  dy-
namics  requires  an  approach  that  does
justice to context-dependency, since it is a
particular context that leads to the emer-
gence of a specific phenotype. Neglecting
the context would thus necessarily lead to
a failure to understand the developmental
system. (this collection, p. 6)
Again, we couldn’t agree more with Drs. Nagel
and Oyama. What WST potentially adds to the
notion of a developmental system is the idea that
self-sustaining systems constitute embodiments of
their developmental contexts. The advantage here
is the same advantage we encountered when ad-
dressing  WST’s  relationship  to  Ingold’s  (2011)
being-in-the-world approach  to  meaning.  By
providing a coherentist ontology that renders real-
ity  inherently  meaningful,  WST  constitutes  a
meaningful alternative to Hard Naturalism’s cor-
respondence-driven assertion that reality is inher-
ently meaningless. As a result, WST allows one to
utilize  Oyama’s (1985) notion of  developmental
contexts in a way that prevents one from having
to explain how it is that developmental contexts
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render an inherently meaningless reality meaning-
ful.  Specifically,  developmental  contexts  don’t
have to render meaningless reality meaningful be-
cause, according to WST, all phenomena are con-
text dependent and, therefore, inherently mean-
ingful.
4 Conclusions
In the end, we agree with Dr. Nagel’s assertion
that  pragmatism  and  anthropology  provide  a
means of  thickening our descriptions of bodies
and  meaning.  We  further  propose  that  WST
helps achieve such a  thickening because it  as-
serts that bodies (i.e.,  embodied contexts)  are
meaning.  From this  perspective,  anthropology
and cognitive science both involve the study of
meaning, and differ only in that they focus their
descriptions  on  different  levels  of  nested  con-
text, or, to say it another way, different levels of
nested meaning.
In addition to providing a means of integ-
rating  cognitive  science  and  anthropology,
WST’s focus on a coherence approach to truth,
as  opposed  to  a  correspondence  approach  to
truth, puts it in a position to provide an integ-
rative  framework  for  scholarship  in  general
(Jordan &  Vandervert 1999;  Jordan &  Vinson
2012). In short, all disciplines study some scale
of  reality,  and any scale  being  measured,  be-
cause of its inescapable context dependence, is
inherently meaningful. This observation leads to
yet another point at which we are in agreement
with Dr. Nagel. Specifically, we very much ap-
preciate her  assertion that  WST helps to de-
velop a different approach to  what people are.
By modeling all of reality as context-dependent,
and self-sustaining systems as embodiments of
context,  WST  conceptualizes  each  and  every
one of us as world in world instead of as mean-
ingless physical systems. As a result, we are all
inescapably  meaningful  and  efficacious.
Everything  we  do  alters  the  contexts  within
which we sustain ourselves.  Everything we do
matters. 
Given WST’s ability to provide a means of
bypassing  the  meaningless  view  of  reality  we
have been led to via Hard Naturalism, it is not
clear to what extent philosophy is so much ex-
periencing a pragmatic turn (Engel et al. 2013)
as it is experiencing a holist turn (Jordan 2013).
If it proves to be the latter, sustaining such a
turn will be difficult, for it will force us to ex-
perience our scientific concepts (e.g.,  physical,
chemical, biological) as epistemic tools we must
necessarily utilize if we are to get on with the
cooperative,  social  practice of  science. As was
stated by Oakeshott (1933) however, science as
a mode of experience is inherently an abstrac-
tion, an arrestment from the whole. This means
that  while  the practice of  science necessitates
that  we  generate  conceptual  abstractions  re-
garding  that  within  which  we are  nested,  we
must  always  remember  that  our  abstractions
can never satisfy a correspondence-driven defini-
tion of truth. In short, while me must necessar-
ily represent, we must simultaneously commit to
uncertainty. Perhaps it was the potential pathos
of this conundrum that W. G. Sebald was refer-
ring to in his poem After Nature:
For it is hard to discover
the winged vertebrates of prehistory
embedded in tablets of slate.
But if I see before me
the nervature of past life
in one image, I always think
that this has something to do
with truth. Our brains, after all,
are always at work on some quivers
of self-organization, however faint,
and it is from this that an order
arises, in places beautiful
and comforting, though more cruel, too,
than the previous state of ignorance
(2003, p. 2)
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